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Abstract  
The improvement of financial intermediation functions is crucial for a robust banking 
system. When lending, banks have to cope with such problems as information 
asymmetry and adverse selection. In order to mitigate these problems, banks have to 
product information and improve their techniques of lending. During the 1998 
financial crisis, Indonesia’s banking system suffered severe damage and revealed that 
the country’s banking intermediation functions did not work well. This paper examines 
the financial intermediation functions of banks in Indonesia and analyzes the 
importance of bank lending to firms. The focus is on medium-sized firms, and 
“relationship lending”, one of the bank lending techniques, is used to examine financial 
intermediation in Indonesia. The results of logit regressions show that the relationship 
between a bank and a firm affects the probability of bank lending. The amount of 
borrowing and collateral are also affected by a firm’s relationship with a bank. When 
viewed from the standpoint of relationship lending to medium-sized firms, Indonesian 
banks cannot be criticized for any malfunction of financial intermediation. 
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Abstract 
The improvement of financial intermediation functions is crucial for a robust banking system. When 
lending, banks have to cope with such problems as information asymmetry and adverse selection. In 
order to mitigate these problems, banks have to product information and improve their techniques of 
lending. During the 1998 financial crisis, Indonesia’s banking system suffered severe damage and 
revealed that the country’s banking intermediation functions did not work well. This paper examines 
the financial intermediation functions of banks in Indonesia and analyzes the importance of bank 
lending to firms. The focus is on medium-sized firms, and “relationship lending”, one of the bank 
lending techniques, is used to examine financial intermediation in Indonesia. The results of logit 
regressions show that the relationship between a bank and a firm affects the probability of bank 
lending. The amount of borrowing and collateral are also affected by a firm’s relationship with a 
bank. When viewed from the standpoint of relationship lending to medium-sized firms, Indonesian 
banks cannot be criticized for any malfunction of financial intermediation. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial systems in development economies are often perceived as fragile. The fragility can 
be attributed to the immaturity of banking financial intermediation functions such as a deficiency of 
screening ability, banks’ poor risk management, and undeveloped legal and accounting systems. 
Improvement of financial intermediation is one of the most crucial issues in the development of a 
country’s financial system.  
When providing loans, banks have to cope with problems of asymmetric information and 
adverse selection, therefore collecting information on clients and the production of information are 
most important for banks. A rapid increase in non-performing loans is one of the consequences of 
massive lending based on the production of insufficient information. Indonesia is a case in point.  
This paper examines the financial intermediation functions in the Indonesian banking sector 
and analyzes the importance of bank lending to firms. It seems that the vulnerability of the banking 
sector aggravated the situation in Indonesia during the financial crisis in 1998, as indicated by the 
fact that the rate of nonperforming loans rose to 58.7% in 1999. In this paper the financial 
intermediation functions of banks will be evaluated from the standpoint of the relationship between 
firms and banks with the focus of examination being on medium-sized firms. 
  
2. Bank Lending to Medium-sized Firms in Indonesia 
2.1 Why medium-sized firms? 
During and after the 1998 financial crisis, Indonesia’s banking sector suffered serious damage. 
The large depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah made the net worth of most commercial banks 
inadequate. Non-performing loans rose rapidly, and the average rate for such loans at foreign 
exchange banks increased to 76.9%. Major commercial banks were bailed out through capital 
injections from the government and nationalization. At that time it was reported that 70% to 90% of 
bank loans had been channeled to related companies (September 29, 1998, Jakarta Post). This fact 
raises doubts about the financial intermediation functions of Indonesian banks. Before the financial 
crisis and nationalization, major private banks belonged to conglomerates or business groups. 
Indonesian conglomerates had many large blue-chip companies operating in various sectors. 
Therefore Indonesian banks did not need to product information for channeling loans to related 
parties because information asymmetry did not exist within the business group. Thus if there were no 
information problems when banks allocated loans to related companies, it is difficult to affirm 
whether or not Indonesian banks have financial intermediation functions. However, how about when 
lending to small and medium-sized firms?  Unlike large companies, small and medium-sized firms 
are not related to conglomerates, and their information varies. Thus small and medium-sized firm 
lending seems to be meaningful for examining and evaluating banks’ financial intermediation 
functions. 
Although most bank lending is allocated to large companies, these companies have various 
funding sources in addition to domestic bank borrowing. Issuing stocks and bonds on capital markets 
and borrowing on international markets are other alternatives. For small and medium-sized firms, 
however, financing is a major difficulty, and bank borrowing, while difficult, is the most important 
external financial source for them. This is another reason for focusing on lending to small and 
medium-sized firms. 
Another reason lies within the context of Indonesia. Lending to small firms is not so difficult 
for banks because such lending is given preferential treatment. Loans to small firms are regulated by 
the central bank, and commercial banks in Indonesia are obligated to allocate 20% of their total 
loans to small-scale business, up to Rp500 million (= US$56,000) per client. This preferential 
treatment is called KUK (Kredit Usaha Kecil [Small Business Credit]). If a bank does not conform 
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to this regulation, it is penalized. On the other hand, if a bank follows the regulation, it gets a bonus. 
Thus banks have incentives to lend to small firms: they avoid penalties and get bonuses 
(Hamada-Takeda [2000]). Figure 1 shows that the percentage of KUK loans does not exceed 20% of 
total bank loans, which indicates that bank lending behavior to small firms is not based on 
self-motivated decisions. Under the KUK regulation there is no need for banks to voluntarily 
improve their techniques for lending to small firms. 
 
 
Figure 1 Value and Percentage of Bank Loans 
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As there is no government intervention, focusing on lending to medium-sized firms seems the 
most suitable for examining the financial intermediation functions of Indonesian banks. When 
lending to such firms, banks have to collect information and make lending decisions on their own. 
 
2.2 What is the scale of lending to medium-sized firms?  
It is difficult to identify the scale of lending to medium-sized firms, however it is possible to 
estimate by comparing the sources of funds for large and medium-sized firms. Figures 2-a and 2-b 
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describe the sources of funds for the private sector.  From these figures we can see a shift in the 
sources of funds.  
 
Figure 2-a Private-Sector Sources of Funding in 1997 
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Figure 2-b Private Sector Sources of Funding in 2004 
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Source: Author 
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Before the financial crisis in 1997, massive amounts of foreign capital flowed in: 39% of 
private sector capital was overseas debt; 49% was lending from domestic banks, and capital markets 
accounted for 11%. After the crisis overseas debt decreased to 33%: domestic bank loans fell to 42%, 
while capital markets increased to 25%. 
In the two figures, “private sector excluding KUK” is regarded as bank lending to large and 
medium-sized firms. The “private sector excluding KUK” decreased between 1997 and 2004 from 
28% to 15% as a percentage of total sources of funds, while utilization of capital markets increased 
from 11% to 25%. Conjecturing that large firms for the most part shifted from domestic bank loans 
to capital markets, the current domestic bank-loan market would then be composed by and large of 
medium-sized firms and some large firms unable to shift to capital markets. Thus it can be argued 
that the 15% “private sector excluding KUK” lending in 2004 was mostly to medium-sized firms. 
 
 
3. Relationship Lending Versus Transaction Lending 
In the previous section we estimated the present scale of bank lending to medium-sized firms. 
In this section we will look at bank lending techniques to these firms. Boot defined the provision of 
financial services by a financial intermediary as the: 1) investment in obtaining customer-specific 
information, often proprietary in nature; and 2) evaluation of the profitability of these investments 
though multiple interactions with the same customer over time and/or across products (Boot[1999]). 
Thus information is key to a financial intermediary. 
When providing financial services, information asymmetry is a serious problem for banks 
especially in the case of small and medium-sized firms because information on large firms is 
relatively available. Large firms usually prepare financial statements and provide public information. 
According to Udell lending techniques are based on: 1) financial statements, 2) relationship between 
bank and firm, 3) credit-scored lending, 4) asset, 5) factoring, and 6) trading credit (Udell: 2004). 
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Among these techniques, transactions-based lending is the most major one, under which the lending 
decisions are based on “hard” information that is relatively easily available like financial statement, 
credit score and asset at the time of loan origination, and does not rely on the “soft” data gathered 
over the course of a relationship with the borrower (Berger and Udell [2002]). While the most 
important in lending to small firms is relationship lending which emphasizes the length of time in a 
relationship between a bank and a firm.  
The relationship between a bank and a firm has several advantages for the firm that go beyond 
just borrowing. The fact of obtaining a loan from a bank improves the firm’s reputation and a longer 
bank-firm relationship brings more merits to the borrower. For example, at the beginning of a 
relationship, the interest rate on a loan is higher and much more collateral is required; however after 
several years, the interest rate decreases and the required collateral also decreases because of the 
bank’s accumulation of information on the firm. The interest rate especially is greatly affected by the 
length of a firm’s relationship with a bank (Berger and Udell[1995]). 
It is understandable that banks product and accumulate information through their relationships 
with firms, and this mitigates the problem of information asymmetry. As required collateral 
decreases proportionally with the length of a relationship, the function of collateral comes to be 
regarded not as a prerequisite but a compliment of lending. 
As well as being a useful technique for banks, relationship lending is also useful for small 
firms. The next section examines the actual conditions of financing for medium-sized firms in 
Indonesia, and the funding sources these firms prefer. 
 
4. Financing of Medium-sized Firms 
The BPS (Badan Pusat Satistik [Statistics of the Republic of Indonesia]) provides data on 
large (more than 100 employees) and medium-sized (from 20 to 99 employees) manufacturing firms 
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covering basic information about firms, their output, value added, expenditures on inputs, sales, 
investment and financing. The data are obtained through annual surveys of more than 20,000 firms. 
This paper uses data for 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2001 in order to examine financing for investment. 
The reasons of choosing the years 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2001 are the following. In 1993 the 
largest number of firms responded to the annual survey, and the year 1993 is regarded as reflecting 
very well Indonesia’s strong economy before the financial crisis. The year 1996 is expected to reflect 
the bubble economy just before the crisis; the year 1999 reflects the worst economic situation just 
after the crisis, and the year 2001 is expected to show the slight recovery from the damage of the 
crisis.  
From 1993 to 1996 the total number of medium-sized firms increased 26.6% from 18,163 to 
22,997. It was the period when the Indonesian economy grew rapidly due to the government’s 
liberalization policies. In 1999 and 2001 the number decreased slightly.  Table 1 shows the number 
of firms that undertook new investment in each of the examined year. In 1993, 2,583 firms 
undertook new investment which accounted for 14.2% of the total number of medium-sized firms. In 
1996 the percentage of new investment increased to 41.6%; however in 1999 and 2001 this 
decreased to 19.5% and 19.0% respectively because of the financial crisis. 
 
Table 1  Investment by Medium-sized Firm  
  Total Number of Medium-sized Firm     
    Number of Firms Newly Investing    
       
survey response rate of finance 
sources of investment 
1993 18,163 2,583 （14.2％） 98.7%
1996 22,997 9,560 （41.6％） 61.6%
1999 22,070 4,311 （19.5％） 63.6%
2001 21,396 4,063 （19.0％） 54.5%
Source: BPS 
The BPS surveys provide the sources of funds for investment. Table 2 shows the main sources 
of these funds. Respondent firms can check the categories that apply to their own situation; these 
8 
include: own funds, retained earnings, bank loans, capital markets, international markets, and 
government funding. In the four years examined, 30% - 40% of firms utilized bank loans, while 60% 
relied on their own funds, and 40% - 50% used retained earnings; only 4% - 6% of firms utilized 
capital markets. Thus most firms preferred to use internal sources. 
 
Table 2 Numbers of firms by source of funds 
  1993 1996 1999 2001 
   ％  ％  ％  ％ 
Bank loans 1,003 39.4 2,010 33.6 987 34.7 640 28.9
Own funds 1,587 62.4 3,700 61.8 1,735 61 1,578 71.3
Retained earnings 1,191 46.8 3,331 55.6 1,471 51.7 1,098 49.6
Stocks/bonds 111 4.4 406 6.8 191 6.7 94 4.2
Source: BPS 
 
Although most firms use a combination of several funding sources (Table 3), a firm’s own 
funds is the single most preferred source. In the four years examined, 25%- 30% of firms used their 
own funds; around 20% used retained earnings; those relying on bank loans were only 6%-12%. 
Clearly firms prefer to use internal funds rather than external sources. This observation fits the 
pecking order theory which asserts that firms prefer internal financing first, then external financing, 
through the issuing of debt and stock (Fama and French [2002]) . 
 
Table 3 
Combination Sources Single Sources 
  
  
Bank loans Own funds Retained 
earnings 
Bank loans Own funds Retained 
earnings 
1993 39.6 52.9 46.7 12.2 27.6 18.4 
1996 34.1 62.7 56.4 7.5 25.9 20.6 
1999 36.0 63.3 37.5 8.8 24.5 19.5 
2001 28.9 71.2 49.6 6.3 34.7 17.4 
Source: BPS      
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5. Data and Empirical model 
 5.1 Data 
The above discussion has showed that medium-sized firms prefer internal funding sources. 
The question then is how banks determine loans. This section examines determinants of bank 
lending using logit regression analysis. From the BPS data of large and medium-sized manufacturing 
firms, the data for medium-sized firms in 1993, 1996 and 1999 are used. Table 4 presents the 
descriptive statistics. 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics 
1993  Total of 2583 firms    (thousand Rp) 
  Average minimum maximum Std. Dev. 
Employees 45 20 99 21
Output 1,167,948 3,756 60,741,006 3,958,345
Own funds 778,059 0 666,547,444 17,819,240
Bank loans 613,302 0 795,805,182 16,412,820
Retained earrings 628,952 0 640,079,853 17,809,960
Age of firms 12 0 93 13
Assets 117,003 0 50,500,000 1,464,434
     
1996  Total of 4448 firms    (thousand Rp) 
  Average minimum maximum Std. Dev. 
Employees 38 20 99 19
Output 737,308 3,069 101,920,749 2,754,430
Own funds 377,296 0 568,000,000 9,631633
Bank loans 58.360 0 11,080,000 450,533
Retained earrings 74,809 0 36,800,000 750.943
Age of firms 10 0 95 10
Assets n.a n.a n.a n.a
     
1999  Total of 1636 firms     
  Average minimum maximum Std. Dev. 
Employees 42 20 99 21
Output 3,002,649 4,200 287,187,024 12,148,175
Own funds 954,354 0 848,250,000 21,133,012
Bank loans 430,680 0 175,000,000 5,028,543
Retained earrings 267,540 0 150,000,000 4,080,154
Age of firms 13 0 99 13
Assets 1,479,545 20 286,340,600 12,331,658
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 5.2 Model 
Using the above data, we will examine the probability of firm borrowing . Firm i uses a 
bank loan for new investment in period t. 
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ip  is the probability of firm i using a bank loan. 
   Y      1, in the case of firm i using a bank loan in t. =it
            0, in the case firm i not using a bank loan in t. 
1−tLOAN : dummy variable: if firm i used a bank loan in t-1, 1, not used a bank loan, 0. 
=tOWN dummy variable: if firm i used own capital in t, 1, not used own capital, 0. 
=tEARN dummy variable: if firm i used retained earnings in t, 1, not used retained earnings, 0. 
=AGE years for operation 
=tLNOUT natural logarithm of output at t  
 
6. Empirical Results 
The results of the analysis show that the record of past loans has a positive effect on future 
borrowing. The coefficients of all variables, except AGE, are significant in all three of the years 
examined: 1993, 1996 and 1999. The coefficients of the borrowing record and the natural logarithm 
of output are positive while the coefficients of own funds, retained earnings and international 
borrowing are negative. AGE was expected to affect bank borrowing positively, however it turns out 
not to be significant. 
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Table 5 Regression results 
Year 1993 1996 1999 
Number of observations 2280 3600 1442 
Coefficients  
 (p-value in parentheses)  
Constant -2.47 (0.000) -3.42 (0.000) -3.43 (0.000) 
LOAN (t-1)  2.88 (0.000) 2.54 (0.000) 3.10 (0.000) 
OWN(t) -0.89 (0.000) -0.79 (0.000) -0.53 (0.001) 
EARN(t) -1.01 (0.000) -0.53 (0.000) -0.74 (0.000) 
LOANf(t) -1.01 (0.011) -1.27 (0.007) -0.96 (0.070) 
AGE 0.00 (0.615) 0.00 (0.919) 0.00 (0.398) 
LNOUT(t) 0.16 (0.000) 0.21 (0.000) 0.16 (0.001) 
  
Log likelihood -1076.1863 -1683.7205 -594.31267
Pseudo R2 0.2925 0.2255 0.3325
 
Being based on a logit model, the positive coefficients of this estimation show that there is a 
high probability of borrowing in the given year. For 1993 the coefficient of the previous year’s 
record is 2.88 meaning that if a firm borrowed from a bank in 1992, the probability that it borrowed 
again in 1993 was 94.7%. Likewise for 1996 and 1999 the probability of borrowing is very high, 
around 92.7% and 95.7% respectively. On the other hand, if a firm had other financial sources such 
as its own funds, retained earnings or international markets, the probability of borrowing was low 
because the coefficients of these variables are negative. Thus if a firm has other funding sources , 
that firm is inclined not to resort to bank loans. If output increases the probability of borrowing also 
increases. 
 
7. Relationship Lending and Collateral  
Collateral is one of the important elements in assessing the relationship between a bank and a 
firm. In general banks require collateral for a loan regardless of whether undertaking transaction 
lending or relationship lending. Asset size is a good proxy for collateral; however in the BPS data set, 
12 
not all firms gave answers to the question of asset size1.  
 
Table 6 Comparison of Loans in 1993 to Firms That Borrowed or Did Not Borrow in 1992 
. (thousand of rupiah) 
firms that average loan amount in 1993 average assets in 1993 
did not borrowed in 1992 527,961 698,823 
borrowed in 92 611,446 289,393 
 
Table 6 compares the difference in the average amount of a loan and amount of collateral 
between firms that borrowed in both 1992 and 1993 and those that borrowed only in 1993. The 
average amount of a loan to a firm that borrowed in both years was larger than for a firm that did not 
borrowed in 1992. This indicates that a firm’s past record of borrowing affects the amount of its next 
loan. However, the amount of assets of firms borrowing in both years was much smaller than that of 
firms that borrowed only in 1993 which seems to indicate that assets complement information on a 
firm’s past record of borrowing. 
 
Table 7    Amount of Borrowing and Collateral  
Firms borrowing in 1993 Firms borrowing in 1997* Firms borrowing in 1999
  Borrowed 
in 92 
Did not 
borrow 
Borrowed 
in 96 
Did not 
borrow 
Borrowed 
in 98 
Did not 
borrow 
No. of firms in the 
previous year 569 312 653 178 316 128
% 64.6% 35.4% 78.6% 21.4% 71.2% 28.8%
Ave. output (1,000 Rp) 1,116,317 1,569,987 910,901 707,511 3,066,641 4,532,589
Ave. borrowing（1,000 
Rp） 2,285,861 214,782 134,345 92,317 1,802,415 771,599
Ave. collateral** 
（1,000Rp） 110,875 288,937 39,575 42,711 1,196,403 810,926
Borrowing / Collateral 
amount 4.9% 134.5% 29.5% 46.3% 66.4% 105.1%
*Data on firm assets were unavailable for 1996, therefore data for 1997 were used. 
** Assets are a proxy for collateral 
Source: BPS 
 
                                                  
1 There were 349 firms that provided assets information. 
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From the foregoing analysis it can be argued that for banks in Indonesia, financial 
intermediation functions operate from the standpoint of relationship lending. Table 7 shows that if a 
firm already has a relationship with a bank, the amount that can be borrowed is larger and collateral 
can be smaller than for a firm without a relationship. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examined the funding sources of medium-sized firms and the financial 
intermediation functions of banks in Indonesia from the standpoint of relationship lending. In order 
to mitigate problems of information asymmetry, banks have to product information and improve 
their techniques of lending. This paper examined whether Indonesian banks product information as a 
function of financial intermediation. The results of logit regression show that the relationship 
between banks and firms affects the probability of borrowing. The amount of borrowing and 
collateral is also affected by the existence of a firm’s relationship with a bank. Due to the lack of 
information, the effect of this relationship on interest rates was not examined. However, it can be 
argued that in Indonesia banks perform financial intermediation functions when examined from the 
standpoint of relationship lending. 
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